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Even more basic than the presence of an abundance of experts and specialists, however, is
the need for an amorphous intangible, the will to achieve and succeed. The will of a nation, an
admittedly nebulous and vague idea, ideally is discerned, expressed, and exercised by its leaders
in the government and in the legislature. It is up to these leaders to want and then to initiate,
adopt, and implement the rule of law, a term which itself embodies many concepts but contains
no therapeutic formulas. In this regard, the darling of the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”),
the small nation of Estonia, with a population comparable to that of the island of Manhattan, had
the political and intellectual leadership with the will and the drive to create a market economy
embedded in the rule of law. How such a will arises or is created is the subject for a separate
sociological study and not a topic for this Essay. But the positive consequences of the leadership of
Estonia in exercising and implementing this national will stands not so much as a challenge to other
nations still struggling with the transformation process, such as many of the member countries of
the Commonwealth of Independent States (“CIS”), but as an example and a confirmation that a
successful transition from a centrally planned economy to a free market economy can be achieved
quickly. To simply attribute and dismiss Estonia’s emergence as an anomaly due to the difference
of its culture from that of the other peoples in the former Soviet Union, however, as is commonly
done by many academicians, legislators, and other leaders in the nations of the CIS, is simply a
self-fulfilling excuse for inaction, inevitable failure, and cultural arrogance, even if masked as a
compliment. In fact, the prospective, still unheralded, success of the Republic of Georgia in its law
reform efforts belies any such assertions. It is of note that the remarkable emergence of Estonia,
and the expected achievements of Georgia, did not develop in a vacuum, but utilized the support
of the international community to buttress national will.
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INTRODUCTION THE RULE OF LAW! THE RECHTSSTAAT
The concept of the rule of law and its European continental
variation, Rechtsstaat, has received considerable popular play
from politicians, businessmen, and reformers since the collapse
of communism in the transforming countries of Eastern Eu-
rope,' specifically in 1989 in Poland and the other Central Euro-
pean nations and in 1991 in the then Soviet Union. The need
for the rule of law, especially in the transforming economies of
these nations of Eastern Europe, is regularly heralded by the
press. Economists encumbered in their work by its absence par-
ticularly decry that omission. Professor Jeffrey Sachs, a past and
present economics advisor to many of the governments of those
transforming economies, including Poland and Russia, has un-
derscored the importance of the rule of law on a number of oc-
casions. He noted, in describing the situation in Eastern Eu-
rope, that the "vital role of the rule of law really strikes you when
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nia at Berkeley; B.A., 1967, Columbia College. The Author is a partner in the New York
office of Radon & Ishizumi. From 1987 until 1992, he was a member and Vice-Chair-
man (1989-1992) of the U.S.-Polish Economic Council, an affiliate of the U.S. Chamber
of Commerce, and was chair of the legal committee responsible for reviewing, critiqu-
ing, and revising, together with his counterpart at the Council's sister organization in
Poland, Polish commercial law drafts, particularly the drafts of the foreign investment
law, for submission to the Parliament. From 1989 until 1995, he was an advisor to a
number of Estonian Parliamentary Committees as well as ministries and agencies of the
Government of Estonia, including the Ministries of Economy, Justice and Reform, and
the State Department for Foreign Economic Relations. During 1994 and 1995, the Au-
thor served as advisor to the Deputy Prime Minister (now Prime Minister) of the Gov-
ernment of Crimea, Ukraine with respect to privatization and regional economic devel-
opment. Presently, the Author is an advisor to the Committee on Economic Policy and
Reforms of the Parliament of the Republic of Georgia concerning economic and com-
mercial legislation and also serves as a member of the Board of Advisors, Harriman
Institute, Columbia University.
1. The term "Eastern Europe" is used to refer to the countries of Central Europe
consisting of Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the
Slovak Republic, and the countries of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
("USSR") consisting of the previously occupied Baltics States, or Republics of Estonia,
Latvia, andLithuania, and the member nations of the Commonwealth of Independent
States of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Rus-
sian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.
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you see a country that doesn't have it."2  Talbot D'Alemberte,
former President of the American Bar Association, in a message
to the Association in 1992 on the challenge presented by the
former Soviet Union, did not fail to notice Professor Sachs's es-
teem for the work of the legal profession: "Russia doesn't need
economists. It needs lawyers. " 3
The mere presence of an army of lawyers representing dif-
ferent and normally opposing interests and clients could not
have been what Professor Sachs contemplated, at least not for
the initial period of transformation in Eastern Europe. Lawyers
at their idealistic best, however, act as exacting public spirited
legislative craftsmen, supporting their fellow lawyer legislators as
well as the economists, poets, and writers and other newly, and
mostly democratically, elected parliamentarians. In this role,
they draft the statutes required by a market economy, which are
what Russia and the other Eastern European nations need dur-
ing the first stage of the revolutionary transformation process. It
is an obvious yet frequently overlooked or forgotten fact that "a
process characterized by a high degree of uncertain, statutory
law - which has the specific quality of determining reasonable
expectations in the short, medium and long term - can make a
positive, and indeed indispensable, contribution to creating a
framework for macroeconomic and macropolitical changes." 4
Moreover, lawyers, with the structured thinking, approach and
methods that are assumed and expected qualities of a profes-
sional counselor in the West, were and are needed to lay the
foundation and the direction of a Rechtsstaat by preparing both
interim acts and permanent enactments.
Even more basic than the presence of an abundance of ex-
perts and specialists, however, is the need for an amorphous in-
tangible, the will to achieve and succeed. The will of a nation,
an admittedly nebulous and vague idea, ideally is discerned, ex-
pressed, and exercised by its leaders in the government and in
the legislature. It is up to these leaders to want and then to initi-
ate, adopt, and implement the rule of law, a term which itself
2. The Russian Republic: Issues and Opportunities, PRISM, Third Quarter 1992, at 25
(citing conversation with Jeffrey Sachs).
3. Talbot D'Alemberte, Our Eastern European Challenge: Providing Technical Assist-
ance to Struggling Democracies, 78 ABAJ. 8, 8 (1992).
4. ROLF KNIEPER & MARK BOGUSLAVSKIJ, CONCErt FOR LEGAL COUNSELING IN TRANS-
FORMATION STATES 65 (1995).
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embodies many concepts but contains no therapeutic formulas.
In this regard, the darling of the International Monetary Fund
("IMF"), the small nation of Estonia, with a population compa-
rable to that of the island of Manhattan, had the political and
intellectual leadership with the will and the drive to create a
market economy embedded in the rule of law. How such a will
arises or is created is the subject for a separate sociological study
and not a topic for this Essay. But the positive consequences of
the leadership of Estonia in exercising and implementing this
national will stands not so much as a challenge to other nations
still struggling with the transformation process, such as many of
the member countries of the Commonwealth of Independent
States ("CIS"), but as an example and a confirmation that a suc-
cessful transition from a centrally planned economy to a free
market economy can be achieved quickly. To simply attribute
and dismiss Estonia's emergence as an anomaly due to the differ-
ence of its culture from that of the other peoples in the former
Soviet Union, however, as is commonly done by many academi-
cians, legislators, and other leaders in the nations of the CIS, is
simply a self-fulfilling excuse for inaction, inevitable failure, and
cultural arrogance, even if masked as a compliment. In fact, the
prospective, still unheralded, success of the Republic of Georgia
in its law reform efforts belies any such assertions. It is of note
that the remarkable emergence of Estonia, and the expected
achievements of Georgia, did not develop in a vacuum, but uti-
lized the support of the international community to buttress na-
tional will.
I. LEGAL REFORM AND WESTERN SUPPORT
Legal reform in Eastern Europe, although a prerequisite for
carrying out a successful economic reform effort and the key for
a transparent and non-corrupt privatization of state owned econ-
omies, has regularly been left to the vagaries of the political pro-
cess with its shifting foci, switching alliances, and hidden agen-
das, not to mention inexperienced parliamentarians and govern-
ment officials. International institutions, such as the IMF and
the World Bank, possess the stature and the necessary financial
clout, especially in Eastern Europe, to impose financial and
other conditions, often decried as draconian by their detractors,
prior to extending needed standby and other credits to those
1997]
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nations seeking to achieve economic price stability and restore
their economic health. Still, while many of the institutions'
funding conditions, often presented as recommendations, are
well reasoned and commendable, they are not necessarily ade-
quately prioritized. At times, they lack a realistic timetable and
generally only touch on legal issues. In fact, it is quite surprising
that despite their intense, active, and indispensable involvement
in the economies of Eastern Europe, these institutions refrain
from mandating specific commercial or corporate law reforms.
The only exception is foreign investment legislation, where the
principle of equal treatment for domestic and foreign investors,
whether in the form of tax holidays or other privileges, has be-
come dogmatic, operating truth. In addition, major national do-
nors such as the United States and Germany, as well as the Euro-
pean Union, readily offer development and other assistance, but
do not condition their aid on the adoption of a recognizable and
comprehensible legal system. Otherwise, such a politically piv-
otal nation as Ukraine would probably not be identified as a land
of contradictory and incomprehensible statutes, conflicting and
indeterminate presidential decrees reminiscent of the Soviet
style of rule making, and excessive and confusing bureaucratic
regulations.
This understandable, Western reluctance stems from an al-
most universal hesitation to impose or dictate, or to appear to
impose or dictate, one's own legal norms on another nation,
even in the area of business law, with the possible threatening
outcries of legal imperialism. Nevertheless, all of the nations of
Eastern Europe have individually, and in an uncoordinated man-
ner, ultimately relied on foreign experts and adopted foreign
legal concepts, principles, and laws, especially in the revamping
of their civil and commercial law systems. After the passage of
varying periods of time and intermittent discussions and debates
about the merits of relying on another nation's laws, as well as
the concomitant interpretations of such laws, the nations of East-
ern Europe have invariably come to accept that which the West
assumes as a self-evident truth, that commercial law is not a prov-
ince of national norms. In fact, "[o]nly during the relatively
short era of European nationalism in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries was there a general - albeit disputed - view
that commercial law should be subject solely to national provi-
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sions. "5
There has also been a lack of an international consensus
among donors as to which, if any, legal pattern or system to rec-
ommend, let alone follow. In particular, the debate has been
between Anglo-American law, with its common law and particu-
larly strong reliance on judicial interpretation, if not law making,
and the statutory approach, whether of the German based Civil
Code type or the French Napoleonic Code version. The basic
German approach has normally won out, as in the case of Po-
land and the other nations of Central Europe, Russia, Estonia,
and Georgia, although specialized laws have often followed a
U.S. model and stock exchange regulations are not infrequently
patterned upon the French format.
The lack of agreement has had the logical and obvious con-
sequence of a half-hearted international commitment to law re-
form in Eastern Europe. In addition, the lack of consensus and
coordination hides the subdued, but not necessarily subtle com-
petition between the donor nations, sometimes behind the mask
of the European Union, as they consciously and unconsciously
promote the export of their legal concepts or systems and offer
competing drafts of different legislation. Moreover, legal advi-
sors, who are normally practitioners in either private practice or
government service and who are regularly selected for short
term assignments in a national or EU bidding competition with
its characteristic inadequate level of project funding and eco-
nomical level of advisor compensation, often only have a practi-
cal knowledge of their own laws, without an appreciation for the
historical, political, or economic context behind such enact-
ments. A lack of understanding of the political situation, admin-
istrative structures, and economic reality of the nations in which
they are advising regularly compounds the problem. The result
is that questions such as why a particular statute is needed or why
at a specific time, are regularly left unasked and, therefore, un-
answered.
II. THE MODERN GREAT GAME: INTERNATIONAL ADVISING
Law reform, while recognized politically, intellectually, and
even economically as an a urgent priority, ranking on par in im-
5. Id. at 66-67.
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portance with inflation, budget deficits, and other economic is-
sues, has often become a stage for petty competition between
different donor nations' expert advisory groups. The extremes
with which some advisors have lobbied for their own drafts of
statutes, including esoteric ones if not in fact their own legal sys-
tem, perhaps out of a sense of pride of authorship and a future
need to be able to cite specific accomplishment, has exasperated
this competition. Professors Rolf Knieper of Germany and Mark
Boguslavskij of Russia, both legal scholars and active law reform-
ers, have politely decried personal lobbying, not least of all be-
cause it tarnishes the development of the still infant legal pro-
cess in Eastern Europe. Professors Knieper and Boguslavskij
wrote:
In the Russian Federation, for example, various laws which
simply imitated American legislative acts were proposed and
accepted. They had been 'imported' by American experts
who knew little about the history of (civil) law in Russia and
ignored the peculiarities of Russian legislation. An interest-
ing example of this approach is provided by the preparation
and enforcement of legislation on trusts. Under American
law the owner can entrust the management of property to an-
other person who then acts as owner vis-a-vis third parties.
This legal concept is unknown in Russian law and indeed in
continental Europe as a whole. The advisers nevertheless
presented the American system to the Committee on the
Management of Public Property, which passed on the draft to
the Russian parliament. After parliament had rejected the
draft on the express grounds that it was incompatible with
Russia's system of civil law, the authors of the law and the
committee opted to submit the law to the president of the
Russian Federation, who for his part put a sizeable portion of
the draft into effect in the form of decree.6
Moreover, law reform itself has also been relegated to com-
peting for attention, "effort," and aid funding with other areas of
concern. Therefore, Eastern European law reform, with the ran-
dom and non-systematic attention paid to it by the international
community, has been left to the vagaries of individual govern-
ments and legislatures to establish their own reform agenda and
follow their own pace or schedule for implementing reform.
This challenging task has proven beyond the enduring capability
6. Id. at 32.
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of many a parliament, except during the short-lived periods of
freedom or independence inspired exuberance and euphoria in
1989, 1990, or 1992 in the nations of Central Europe and in
1991, 1992 or 1993 in the former Soviet Union. Thereafter, only
the political acumen of a strong president, as in the case of Rus-
sia or Ukraine, who is personally subject to intense international
pressures, if not dictates, could move a faction riddled or Soviet
style parliament to pursue a course of law reform and, even then,
with only sporadic success. It is a tell-tale sign of this weakness
that most nations of Eastern Europe have felt compelled to es-
tablish a government with a strong presidency rather than create
a traditional parliamentary system with a prime minister as head
of government.
III. CENTRAL EUROPEAN LAW REFORM
Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary had to free them-
selves from a licensing mentality and a Sovietized legal system
and forsake a centralized government's urge to control. This
contrasts with the nations of the former Soviet Union, which sim-
ply had to brush off the dust from their selectively used, but still
extant, civil codes and wipe the cobwebs off their unused com-
mercial codes. The essence of a capitalistic commercial legal sys-
tem, even if not always recognizable, had never fully disappeared
from the law, although it was obviously officially disdained and
ignored. Still, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary also
found it necessary to call upon experts from Germany, Austria,
and other nations to support their modernizing legal reform
programs. Local expertise in new, or even in respect of unused
provisions of the civil code or commercial code, was certainly
not readily available. Moreover, the nations of Central Europe
all expressed an early, if not immediate, interest in quickly be-
coming members of the European Union. This goal implicitly
imposed a discipline on the law making process of nations seek-
ing to join the European Union as they realized that their laws
would be scrutinized and critiqued by Western experts to ensure
their compatibility and harmonization with the laws of the Mem-
ber States of the European Union. Thus, this foreign policy ob-
jective provided the necessary domestic discipline and expert
foreign support for the rapid modernization of the legal system.
The nations of the former Soviet Union did not have such luxury
1997]
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and, except for the Baltic States, who also aspire to EU member-
ship, did not and do not have such indirect external discipline
imposed on their law making processes.
The nations of the former Soviet Union had a more daunt-
ing task as they had to philosophically and conceptually, if not
structurally, reinvent the legal wheel, despite the traditions of an
existing, albeit Soviet, civil code. Effectively, a new language,
new concepts, and new principles had to be learned, under-
stood, and ultimately mastered. Estonia and its sister Baltic
states were no exception, despite their memory, admittedly dis-
tant, consequently vague, and at times inaccurate, of the things
of the 1920s and 1930s.
IV. THE WUNDERKIND OF THE EX-SOVIET UNION: ESTONIA
Estonia declared, or reconfirmed as it had been recognized
internationally as an independent nation occupied by the Soviet
Union since 1940 and, therefore, de jure not part of the Soviet
Union, its independence from the Soviet Union on August 20,
1991. With this act, Estonia inherited a moribund Sovietized in-
dustry, dependent on Russia for its lifeline supply of gas and oil,
and a Soviet legal system. Still, just five short years later, Estonia
has already achieved a Gross National Product ("GNP") per cap-
ita which compares favorably with that of Korea, one of the re-
nowned Asian Tigers.7
A. Economic Wunderkind
Estonia's GNP per capita as of 1995 was US$2290, thirty per-
cent of Korea's per capita GNP.8 Estonia's currency, the first na-
tional currency of any part of the former Soviet Union, has been
the most stable of the ex-Soviet lands at eight kroons to the
Deutsche mark since its adoption almost five years ago on June
20, 1992. Estonia's unemployment rate has not topped 2.7 per-
cent,9 and its total foreign investment ranks it third after the
7. Data provided by the Embassy of the Republic of Estonia, Washington D.C. (un-
published, on file with the Fordham International Law Journal)
8. Unpublished data from the World Bank, International Economics Department.
9. This rate of unemployment was registered in April 1993 and the data was pro-
vided by the Bank of Estonia. Private studies, such as the EMOR study, have estimated
the unemployment rate as high as 9.1%, which is still not unfavorable in comparison
with the Member States of the European Union. Eesti Pank Bulletin No. 1 12 (1994).
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Czech Republic and Hungary on a per-capita basis."0 Moreover,
in 1994, Estonia ranked first among the East European nations
on a per capita basis in receiving foreign investment."1 In fact,
Estonia was considerably ahead of its two peers, Hungary and
the Czech Republic, as Estonia's per capita direct foreign invest-
ment totaled US$158, while Hungary registered US$111 and the
Czech Republic registered US$83.1 2
Estonia's privatization program, modeled on the East Ger-
man Treuhand system of international tenders with direct cash
sales and guaranteed new investment, succeeded in not only in-
jecting fresh foreign capital of over US$200 million in direct
sales revenue1 3 into the Estonian economy, but also in building a
local entrepreneurial business class at the same time. These sta-
tistics do not reveal the basis for the success of Estonia's leap-
frog, Asian Tiger type, economic performance, namely effective
legal reform.
B. The Legal Wunderkind
The law reform effort of Estonia was self-initiated, consist-
ently and progressively pursued, and progressed step-by-step. Es-
pecially during the initial stage of law reform, the Government
systematically drafted and enacted statutes with the regular ad-
vice and support of foreign experts. The subsequent, or secon-
dary, stage of reform, with its focus on professional institution
building, namely daily legal interpretation by practicing attor-
neys, judicial review, and enforcement, does not permit haste,
but only can come with education, training, experience, and
time. This second stage also places a premium on ajudiciary not
only versed in the principles of the newly enacted laws, but also a
judiciary prepared to assume its new responsibilities as in-
dependent and objective interpreters of statutes and arbiters of
10. Data provided by the Embassy of the Republic of Estonia, Washington, D.C.
(unpublished, on file with Embassy).
11. Data provided by the Embassy of the Republic of Estonia, Washington D.C.
(unpublished, on file with Embassy).
12. Republic of Estonia, Government Activity Plan for Joining the European Union 30
(1996) (citing reports of European Bank for Reconstruction and Development) [here-
inafter Government Activity Plan].
13. Data provided by the Embassy of the Republic of Estonia, Washington D.C. In
addition, US$150 million was committed for further capital investment.
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legal principles which are not necessarily explicitly set forth in a
statute's provisions.
1. The Beginning of Law Reform
Estonia, inspired by its past as a prosperous independent
nation during the 1920s and 1930s and challenged by the pres-
ent prosperity of its northern neighbor, did not hesitate in seek-
ing to adapt and adopt the structures of its economically pros-
perous neighbors on the Baltic Sea. Inspiration, however,
clearly a source of strength and conviction, may indicate a will-
ingness and an openness but, in and of itself, does not translate
into understanding, and certainly not capacity, let alone ability.
The old ways, the Soviet ways, especially in thinking and intellec-
tual expression, had become a self-perpetuating frozen mind-set
and reflexive habit which could only be overcome with conscious
striving. Inspiration, a dream if you will, does provide a direc-
tion and here, in the case of Estonia, even a model. The concep-
tual model was a market economy anchored in private property
and motored by entrepreneurial activity.
2. A Small But Significant Change in Thinking
In adopting the Law of the Republic of Estonia on Owner-
ship in 1990, while Estonia was still a Soviet state, the statute's
authors, composed mostly of reform-minded professors from
Tartu University Law Faculty, succinctly set forth the forward-
looking philosophy of this interim statute in the Law's preamble:
The transfer of the economy of the Estonian Republic to the
principles of market economy presumes the legal regulation
of new social relations. Until the adoption of the new Civil
Code of the Estonian Republic the property relations shall be
regulated by the present law .... The Property Law of the
Estonian Republic is the legal basis for developing entrepre-
neurship, [and for] privatization of property .... 14
This statute was revolutionary, for it restored the discredited
concept of private property in a territory within the Soviet
Union. Furthermore, it encouraged private initiative by declar-
14. ESTONIA'S WAY TO MARKET ECONOMY' SELECTION OF LEGISLATION OF THE REPUB-
LIC OF ESTONIA ON BUSINEss AcTvTIES 5 (Anu Avi, ed. & Tiiu Allik et al. trans., 1991)
[hereinafter MARKET ECONOMY] (adopted by Supreme Council of Estonian Republic on
June 13, 1990).
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ing that the "private ownership right originates from the profit
obtained from entrepreneurship ... ."15 Still, this empowering
statute rested on its implementation in the Enterprise Law 6
adopted less than one year earlier, on November 23, 1989, which
still adhered in many of its provisions to Soviet-type thinking.
The drafters, consisting of the same group of reform-minded
professors, were conscious and apologetic about their work, but
in 1989 they did not have the theoretical or scholarly tools, not
to mention political power, to pursue a different, or more West-
ern, approach. They lamented, "there were serious difficulties
in finding English-language equivalents to some legal terms...
[and, therefore,] these terms are based on the Soviet legal sys-
tem."1 7 They noted ruefully, "this is not a justification." l"
The Enterprise Law enshrined the right and power of a bu-
reaucrat to deny any person a permit for founding an enterprise
on vague, imprecise, and prospectively arbitrary standards, if
"the enterprise [is] detrimental to the interests of the corre-
sponding administrative area."' 9 Fortunately, in practice, in-
dependent-spirited Estonian bureaucrats did not exercise this
right regularly. Still, the underlying theory, although now
slightly modified, was that a private endeavor was prohibited un-
less and until permitted. A license was still the order of the day.
3. The Break in Sovietized Thinking
The break with Soviet tradition and Soviet thinking oc-
curred coincidentally with the restoration of Estonia's indepen-
dence on August 21, 1991 and with its adoption of a permissive
foreign investment law on September 11, 1991.20 This law ena-
bled a foreign investor to undertake an investment in any activity
whatsoever unless an activity specifically required a license or
was in fact prohibited. The traditional Soviet rule had been re-
versed as now everything was permitted unless prohibited. With
this provision and the subsequent adoption of a short list of re-
stricted investment areas, a foreign investor was at last free to
15. Property Law, art. 16.1, reprinted in MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 14, at 13.
16. Enterprise Law, reprinted in MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 14 at 24.
17. MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 14, at 5.
18. Id.
19. Enterprise Law, art. 10.1, reprinted in MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 14, at 27.
20. Foreign Investments Act (unofficial translation provided by Embassy of Estonia
in Washington, D.C.).
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determine its field of investment activity, subject ironically to the
conflicting provisions of the Enterprise Law, which was still in
effect. At the legislative level at least, the vestiges of Soviet le-
gal thinking were beginning to disappear, and an openness to
outside foreign investors and foreign methods of doing things
was demonstrated clearly and forcefully. In this manner, the Es-
tonian foreign investment law followed the pattern being set by
the more advanced reforms in Central Europe, for example, Po-
land, which was in the process of enacting a very permissive for-
eign investment law giving foreigners free investment reign.
4. Adoption of a Scheduled Legal Reform Program
Estonia, in its rush to transform itself into a Scandinavian
country, did not have any reluctance to adopt, and at times copy,
the systems of the West. In October 1992, the Minister of Justice
approved a policy paper entitled "Foundational Commercial
Law Agenda for The Republic of Estonia."21 The Mininster in-
troduced this paper after examination and adaptation of the Eu-
ropean continental, specifically German, civil and commercial
code system into Estonia in accordance with a schedule of legis-
lative priorities. The policy paper both stressed the pre-Soviet
legal traditions of Estonia and underscored its geographical, cul-
tural, and economic proximity to Scandinavia and the continen-
tal nations of the European Union, both primary sources for ex-
pected foreign investment.
The policy paper called for the draft Estonian Civil Code of
1940 to be modernized taking into account both current Ger-
man legal norms and EU requirements. The Civil Code of 1940
was influenced heavily by traditional German legal thinking, but
was never enacted because of the 1940 Soviet invasion. The pol-
icy paper assumed that membership in the European Union
would inevitably become a primary foreign policy objective of
Estonia. Harmonization of its laws with that of the European
Union had, therefore, an importance all of its own. The Com-
mercial Code and other business related laws were also to be
drafted in accordance with such norms and requirements.
This decision of the Justice Ministry signaled for Estonia in
1992, just one year after the restoration of its independence and
21. This plan was prepared byJenik Radon and was subsequently put into the form
of a work plan with the assistance of a team of German legal experts.
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only a few months after the introduction by Estonia of the first
post-Soviet currency, its prospective reintegration with the mar-
ket economies of the West, in particular Western Europe. It
meant that Estonia would have a set of laws which were recogniz-
able, familiar, even if not in every detail, and useable by prospec-
tive economic partners. The language of business would at least
be similar, even if not identical. Thus, although some scholars
and politicians naturally questioned whether the legal system of
Germany was the most appropriate, Estonia readily accepted the
position that the legal system of a successful economy, and pref-
erably a geographically proximate one, had to be followed in or-
der to achieve steady and, hopefully, rapid economic transfor-
mation as well as economic integration with the West.
As a consequence of the adoption of the policy paper ap-
proved by the Minister ofJustice, rapid progress was made in law
reform. Estonia almost immediately began to draft and adopt,
with the assistance of a team of German legal experts as well as
this author, a new Civil Code, albeit in parts, as well as a new
Commercial Code.22 The first section of the civil code, enacted
as a separate law, was the Property Law,23 which quickly invigo-
rated the financial sector because secured lending, the absence
of which was seriously hindering economy development, was
now at last possible. The progressive, step-by-step enactment of
the different parts of the Civil Code and related laws were tied
quite pragmatically to the need to energize the Estonian econ-
omy or, in the vernacular, "to get Estonia moving."
Estonia, nevertheless, also had to endure legal mishaps or
22. The Civil Code consists of five parts: The Law on General Provisions became
effective in 1994; the Property Law, a key piece of legislation necessary for the full
operation of the banking sector, became effective in 1993; Family Law, which is not
critical for the conduct of business related transactions, became effective in 1995; In-
heritance Law, also not critical for the conduct of business related transactions, is pres-
ently in draft form and has not been adopted; and Law on Obligations, presently in
draft form, has also not been adopted, but many of its principles are adequately con-
tained in the contracts section of the Soviet civil law legislation, which still governs to
the extent not modified by the Property Law, the Law on General Principles, and other
laws, including the Law on Ownership which entered into force in 1991, all of which
had the effect of significantly modifying that contracts section. The "piece meal" ap-
proach is complex to implement, but acheivable as Estonia pursued a systematic plan
for critical economic legislative enactments. Law on the General Principles of the Civil
Code, Riigi Teataja Part 11994, No. 53, art. 889, in Legal Acts of Estonia No. 2 35 (April
12, 1995) (unofficial translation provided by Embassy of Estonia in Washington, D.C.).
23. Property Law, reprinted in MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 14, at 8.
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errors in legal reform, especially prior to the adoption of a legis-
lative reform policy program. These occurred often, especially
when the rationale for a statute, its intended purpose, and possi-
ble consequences under the local economic conditions had not
been examined reflectively. The Bankruptcy Code, 24 drafted at
the urgent behest of officials and legislators uncertain about
what to do with all the financially-insolvent, state-owned enter-
prises, is a modem Western-style code, but a prime example of
the adoption of a statute without consideration of its possible
effects. The Bankruptcy Code applied to both private and state
or government-owned entities, including those designated for
privatization. In one case, the Estonian tax authorities initiated
bankruptcy proceedings for unpaid taxes against a state-owned
enterprise in the process of being privatized. This had the
anomalous result that the enterprise was no longer subject to the
authority of the Estonian Privatization Agency, but instead be-
came subject to the jurisdiction of the city court administering
the entity's bankruptcy proceedings. The enterprise ceased op-
erations, its employees were dismissed, and the assets, consisting
effectively of real estate, were sold at an auction to satisfy the
claims of the entity's debtors. This had the absurd consequence
that one government ministry was simply enriched at the ex-
pense of another as well as at the expense of the Government of
Estonia. Only thereafter was an amendment adopted to lift the
effectiveness of the Bankruptcy Code in respect to enterprises
subject to privatization.
V. GEORGIA: THE SURPRISE CIS REFORMER
The Republic of Georgia, a nation without any direct tradi-
tional ties to Europe or to elsewhere in the West, other than its
neighbor Turkey, has, despite several years of secessionist and
civil wars, quietly and independently without any intellectual,
legal links to Estonia, followed Estonia's pattern of statutory law-
making. The Georgian motivation stemmed directly from eco-
nomic motivation or, perhaps more appropriately, desperation,
as there was "a growing awareness that radical reform of legal
institutions and commercial law is essential to halt the decline in
24. Law on Bankruptcy of the Republic of Estonia, Riigi Teataja 1992, No. 31, art.
403 (adoptedJune 10, 1992), in Legal Acts of Estonia No. 4/5 83 (Oct. 7, 1993) (unofficial
translation provided by Embassy of Estonia in Washington, D.C.).
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production and the increase in illicit economic activity and to
permit the politically desired transition to a social market econ-
omy."2" Of its own accord, Georgia has proved itself as open-
minded to readily adopting the legal norms of another nation
such as Estonia. Georgia, however, has pursued a more compar-
ative course.
Georgia elected a reform-minded legislature in the fall of
1995. Today, this parliament is actively pursuing Georgia's "na-
tional will." It is expected that during the summer of 1997 par-
liamentary session, the Parliament will enact a civil code, based
primarily on the German code, although the intellectual influ-
ence from the Dutch code and from other codes is also evident.
In addition, U.S. legal concepts, for example, in the area of
franchising, have also been introduced and integrated into the
prospective Georgian Civil Code. A new foreign investment law
is also being drafted which will at last dispense with the onerous
licensing requirements for foreign investors, admittedly a recent
throw back to frozen Soviet thinking. A foreign investor can
presently be denied a license under vague, imprecise, and arbi-
trary standards. For example, if a proposed investment "runs
counter to the demographic and social interests of the Republic
of Georgia" the license can be refused.26 The recently adopted
Commercial Code, however, is a skeletal, but functional and
comprehensible, version of the German code on which it is
based. Other economic or commercially-focused laws, such as
the Banking Code, adopted at the behest of the IMF, have U.S.
origins and will have to be revised and conceptually integrated
with Civil Code definitions and Commercial Code corporate
structures. By June 1, 1997, Georgia will have a free market-ori-
ented legal system which will be comprehensible, understanda-
ble, and familiar. It should be attractive to foreign investors, and
it will no longer be an obstacle to economic progress, although
improvements will still need to be enacted.
The basic advisory work, except with respect to the foreign
investment law which admittedly was drafted with the assistance
of other foreign advisors, has, surprisingly, been consistently co-
25. KNEIPER & BOGUSLAVSVaJ, supra note 4, at 59.
26. Law of the Republic of Georgia on Foreign Investments, art. 17, adopted on
June 30, 1995 (unofficial translation provided by Embassy of Georgia in Washington,
D.C.).
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ordinated for several years by the same group of German ex-
perts, assisted periodically by short term specialists. Since the
Georgian parliamentary election in the fall of 1995, the law-mak-
ing process has been quite disciplined without the motivation of
the hope of EU accession. Presidential decrees vying for author-
ity with parliamentary enactments are not the order of the day.
Commercial legislation has been centered in one parliamentary
committee as well as in the Ministry of Justice. Georgia had al-
ready experienced the depths of economic and civic chaos, and
this disaster has become the impetus for change.
VI. THE HARD YEARS AHEAD: THE AEE) FOR
INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENT
Estonia and Georgia, each powered by a goal, whether it is
the restoration of the past, EU membership, or an end to an
economic depression, demonstrate that effective legal reform
can result if given priority and appropriate attention. The na-
tions of Central Europe, which had the easiest physical task of
law production, also underscore the allure and power of a vision,
namely membership in the European Union. These dreams can
become reality through the discipline which emanates from pur-
suing concrete steps to achieve these goals.
Estonia's commitment to law reform has already propelled
it into the arduous second stage of law reform, legal institution
building. This stage, of course, clearly overlaps with the first,
characterized by law-production, almost in an industrial sense,
but receives more attention when the first stage decelerates. Es-
tonia has recognized that the "ultimate enforcement of legisla-
tion is, of course, the judiciary."7 As a natural consequence, but
one which demands the dedication of scarce budget resources,
Estonia intends to launch a training program of seminars for
judges as well as lawyers in order to improve their qualifications
to work with all of the new laws, most of which have been EU
conformed."8 This was a diplomatic way of stating the obvious.
The judicial systems in the nations of Eastern Europe, and espe-
cially of the former Soviet Union, have to overcome a legacy of
actual and perceived corruption and incompetence. Conse-
quently, public acceptance of the judicial system, even a re-
27. Government Activity Plan, supra note 12, at 44.
28. Id.
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formed one, has to be earned. Only the former East Germany
had the luxury of importing well-trained and impartial judges
and, thereby, recreating its entire judiciary.
Georgia, still in the first stage of accelerated law-production,
will reach the second stage as early as the beginning of 1997,
although law production, notwithstanding the reams of laws be-
ing enacted, will still be a major priority. Moreover, it is not real-
istic for most, if not all, of the members of the CIS to contem-
plate EU membership or even associate status in the near future.
But these nations do aspire to attract significant amounts of for-
eign investment and increase the volume of trade with the West.
This will require that these nations offer a familiar, legal regime.
To the extent that their legal systems are still incomprehensible
to the ordinary foreign businessperson and his or her counsel,
disciplined law-making and legal implementation need to be ac-
tively encouraged by the major international financial institu-
tions and the major donor nations, as well as by the European
Union. A firm commitment to law reform in the CIS nations by
the international community could accelerate the process and
assure success. This requires a recognition that law reform is as
important as economic reform and deserves equal priority.
The ideal would be the creation of a legal institution with
the stature and financial strength of an IMF, but this is obviously
politically unrealistic and in actuality impractical. Still, the crea-
tion of an independent, international legal board with supervi-
sory and management responsibility for creating, coordinating,
monitoring, and implementing all public legal assistance pro-
grams would serve to prevent needless competition and duplica-
tive counseling work, as well as ensure systematic law reform im-
plementation, and control a wide range of programs, whether
direct, bilateral, or multilateral, in the transformation nations,
other than those nations subject to the rigorous EU law harmo-
nization regime. With a now almost-universal acceptance among
donors of the European continental civil law approach to East-
ern European law making, narrow "nationalistic" competition
should at (least be less pronounced, even if not coordinated or
systematic.
It may well be a dream, or certainly an ambitious goal, that
the legal reform effort follow a coherent and unified approach,
but it is one that nevertheless needs to be pursued, especially as
"a certain transitional period has [now] elapsed and there are
1997]
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unmistakable signs of disappointment at meager results, at the
consequences of nationalistic segregation and indeed at the
[legal] counseling work itself."29
These meager results are underscored by a rating issued by
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
30
which has a mandate to focus on the law reform efforts in East-
ern Europe, concerning the extensiveness and the effectiveness
of their rules on investment. Only three nations, namely the
Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland received a rating which
compares not too unfavorably with ratings the most advanced
industrial nations would receive.3 1 Estonia alone of the former
Soviet Republics received a satisfactory rating, just behind the
29. KNEIPER & BOGUSLAVIJ, supra note 4, at 69.
30. Government Activity Plan, supra note 12, at Annex 1.1.
31. Id. The ratings and their descriptions are elucidative of the extensive legal
reform work which still needs to be accomplished in Eastern Europe and evaluate the
extensiveness and effectiveness of legal rules on investment:
4* (most advanced industrial economies)
Legal rules closely approximate generally accepted standards internationally
and are readily ascertainable through sophisticated legal advice; investment
laws are well administered and supported judicially, particularly regarding
functioning of courts and land and the orderly and timely registration of pro-
prietary or security interests.
4 (Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland)
Legal rules are clear, generally do not discriminate between foreign and do-
mestic investors and impose few constraints; specialised legal advice readily
available; investment laws reasonably well administered and supported judi-
cially, although the support is sometimes patchy.
3 (Estonia and a number of Central European nations)
Legal rules do not impose major obstacles to the creation of investment vehi-
cles, the taking of security or the export of profits; legal rules are reasonably
clear and specialized legal advice is available; judicial and administrative sup-
port of the law is often inadequate; where such support is adequate, legal rules
often impose significant constraints.
2 (Russian Federation, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania and most of the member
nations of the CIS)
Legal rules often unclear; legal advice often difficult to obtain; legal rules im-
pose constraint to creating investment vehicles, the taking of security or the
export of profits; judicial and administrative support of the law is rudimentary;
where adequate legal rules or legal advice exist, administration of the law is
deficient.
1 (Azerbajian, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan)
Legal rules often very unclear and impose significant constraints to creating
investment vehicles, security interests or repatriation of profits; availability of
legal advice is limited; judicial and administrative of the law is substantially
deficient.
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rating given to the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland.3 2
Russia, Ukraine, and several other ex-Soviet nations languish
with very unsatisfactory ratings as well as civil war torn Tajikistan
which received totally unsatisfactory ratings.33 The only excep-
tions are oil-rich Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan.
To give such a board the clout of a legal IMF, so that its
positions are considered seriously by various governments and
parliaments, all foreign assistance grants and loans, other than
humanitarian or other critical or specialized aid, should be sub-
ject to the satisfaction of stringent legal reform terms and condi-
tions established by such a board. These conditions should be
comparably as demanding, if not as stringent, as those imposed
by the IMF and the World Bank in respect to the economic area.
This board should consist of a limited number of lawyers and
professors from the major donor nations, especially the United
States and Germany, as well as representatives from the leading
international financial institutions and agencies, which are lend-
ers or investors in Eastern Europe, including the IMF, the World
Bank, and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Devel-
opment.
The law reform or legal transformation process in Eastern
Europe, particularly in the CIS and even in the Baltic States of
Latvia and Lithuania, not to mention some Central European
nations, such as Romania, has progressed sporadically and too
slowly. Consequently, the integration of most of these nations
into generally accepted Western ways of conducting business will
not become a reality, certainly not in the near future, without
consistent and concerted Western support. But that support it-
self needs such an independent international legal board or
other meaningful back-up, called clout, in order to affect con-
crete results. The challenge of urgent law reform in Eastern Eu-
rope is still with us.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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